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A B S T R A C T
This year, in 2018, we mark 100 years since the 1918 influenza pandemic. In the last 100 years, we have
expanded our knowledge of public health and increased our ability to detect and prevent influenza;
however, we still face challenges resulting from these continually evolving viruses. Today, it is clear that
influenza viruses have multiple animal reservoirs (domestic and wild), making infection prevention in
humans especially difficult to achieve. With this report, we summarize new knowledge regarding influ-
enza A, B, C and D viruses and their control. We also introduce how a multi-disciplinary One Health
approach is necessary to mitigate these threats.
K E Y W O R D S : influenza; One Health; emerging viruses; zoonoses
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, we mark the centennial of the 1918 influ-
enza pandemic; an event that caused an estimated
20–50 million deaths worldwide [1]. The severity of
the 1918 pandemic was a result of several important
factors including a lack of pre-existing immunity to
this newly emerged virus, as well as overcrowding,
poor sanitation and the lack of antibiotics. However,
despite the production of annually designed vac-
cines and the many improvements in public health
surveillance and infrastructure, each year in the USA
alone, seasonal influenza A and B viruses continue
to evolve and take the lives of 3000–48 000 people
[2]. It is now also clear that other related viruses
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(influenza C and D viruses) may also cause at least subclinical
infections in humans. In short, the ecology of influenza viruses is
recognized today as one of the most complex and difficult to miti-
gate public health problems.
A key component to this complexity is the observation that in-
fluenza A, B, C and D viruses may have numerous animal species
reservoirs (domestic and wild), making their infection prevention
in humans especially difficult to achieve. It also seems clear in at
least recent years that the most important influenza A virus
threats to humans are often amplified in domestic animals.
Modern agricultural practices, such as the worldwide shift to-
wards raising pork and chickens in confined animal feeding oper-
ations (CAFOs) may be amplifying these public health threats [3].
It is also very relevant that human-reservoired influenza viruses
are being introduced into swine CAFOs and sometimes causing
large and important clinical disease outbreaks among the pigs [4,
5]. Some might argue that the solution is to raise pigs in less
animal-dense farms but this position is simply not realistic. It is
through modern agricultural techniques, that include CAFOs, that
most nations are seeking to produce increase meat production to
the increasing demands of rapidly growing human populations.
Hence, we need to find new ways to engage professionals in
human health, animal health, environmental health and agricul-
tural businesses to work together to study the ecology of influenza
viruses, and to jointly develop and test interventions to reduce
their risk to humans and animals. This is the premise behind the
One Health approach. Although the interconnections of humans
and animals have long been recognized [6], One Health was first
officially recognized by the American Veterinary Medical
Association in 2007. One Health calls for deliberate and focused
collaborations between experts in the animal, human and envir-
onmental health fields. A holistic and versatile One Health ap-
proach is now recognized as imperative in fostering the effective
communication and actions needed to respond to influenza virus
threats. Over the last 100 years, this approach has evolved from
isolated disciplines working together only in times of pandemic to
the continued push today for collaboration from public health
workers, medical professionals, veterinarians and many others.
This shift has changed the way influenza, and pandemic influenza
in particular, are approached with an increase in communication,
partnership and outreach when tackling these issues.
Evolutionary medicine is a discipline that uses evolutionary
theory to understand health and disease [7]. The central focus of
this framework is that selection acts on fitness and that evolution
and adaption alone do not cause disease. One Health and evolu-
tionary medicine are interconnected in that both require an inter-
disciplinary approach to complex problem solving. Often both
disciplines work at the intersection of changing environments,
animal and human habitats. In particular, with the case of influ-
enza, the continued evolution and adaptation to new and diverse
host species, as shown in Figure 1, presents a unique problem that
requires the use of both disciplines.
With this report, we will outline newly described influenza virus
types and subtypes and novel developments in influenza virus
detection and control. We also introduce how an interdisciplinary
One Health approach seems the best way forward to mitigating
these threats.
INFLUENZA A VIRUS
Influenza A virus (IAV) [8] is highly infectious and can be
transmitted to humans via direct contact with secretions, aero-
solized respiratory droplets and indirect contact with fomites.
Known for its high morbidity and mortality rates, IAV is the cause
of both seasonal and historic influenza pandemics, including the
severe 1918 H1N1 pandemic, the 1957 H2N2 ‘Asian Flu’ pan-
demic, the 1968 H3N2 pandemic, and most recently the 2009
novel H1N1 virus pandemic, the latter of which likely emerged
from domestic pigs resulted in between 151 700 and 575 400
human deaths worldwide [9].
More recently, influenza activity during the 2017–18 influenza
season has been the highest yet since the 2009 pandemic, with a
cumulative incidence rate of 59.9 influenza-hospitalizations per
100 000 people in the USA [10]. IAVs constituted 84% of the more
than 51 000 specimens tested in public health laboratories across
the USA and Puerto Rico between October of 2017 and February of
2018 [10]. Of the IAV subtypes, 89.9% were IAV H3N2 viruses and
10.1% were IAV H1N1 viruses. More than 71% of the 63 influenza-
associated pediatric deaths this 2017–18 influenza season were
associated with IAV infections, a slightly higher proportion than
the overall proportion (65%) of pediatric deaths attributable to
IAV infection between 2010 and 2016 in the USA [10].
Growing numbers of avian-origin IAVs, which include 16 of the
18 hemagglutinin glycoprotein subtypes and 9 of the 11 neur-
aminidase (NA) subtypes, are increasingly found to infect
humans. Due to increases in the number of human infections with
avian-origin H7N9 IAV in China in 2017, a study of 40 case-patient
clusters across 5 recent epidemics from 2013 to 2017 sought to
determine if human-to-human transmission of H7N9 has
increased in the past 5 years. While the study found no change
in the human-to-human transmission of H7N9 over time, among
the 40 clusters, 35% were classified as probable and 65% as pos-
sible human-to-human transmission [11]. Sustained human-
to-human transmission, however, has not been seen between
epidemics, suggesting that non-human animals are important
for maintenance of this virus. Humans infected with H7N9 typic-
ally present with severe symptoms and the mortality rate is40%.
Environments that facilitate IAV include birds [12], pigs [13],
horses [14], dogs [15] and most recently bats [16]. In particular,
aquatic birds are considered the primordial reservoir of all influ-
enza viruses for avian and mammalian species. Evidence con-
tinues to support the assertion that environments that facilitate
the interaction of human and avian species, such as the live
poultry markets, often increase transmission risk to humans
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[12]. During the 2013 and 2014 IAV (H7N9) outbreak in China, for
example, the majority of patients with laboratory-confirmed cases
of IAV (H7N9) reported recent exposure to live poultry markets
[17]. A type of avian IAV (H7N4) was detected in a human patient,
with a reported history of contact with live poultry, for the first time
in February of 2018, prompting authorities to be on alert for the
pandemic potential of the virus [18]. Additionally, multiple studies
have provided evidence of bidirectional transmission of IAV at the
interface of human and pig populations, especially at agricultural
fairs [13, 19]. Asymptomatic pig entrants in these public exhibit
spaces are suspected viable facilitators for IAVs to jump between
species [13]. Compared with other influenza types, the zoonotic
transmission of IAV has been frequently documented and findings
on the trans-species paths of infection indicate the expanding
potential for new strains of IAV to emerge at the human and
animal interface. There will likely be a continued need for effective
control and prevention of emerging zoonotic IAV. As such, sur-
veillance efforts for IAV would benefit from a One Health approach
that would employ surveillance at the human–animal interface
where novel subtypes are most likely to threaten the human
population.
A select few antivirals have been approved and demonstrated
effective to reduce symptoms of IAV and concurrently reduce
transmission. These are summarized in Table 1. Oseltamivir,
peramivir and zanamivir are three NA inhibitor antiviral interven-
tions. Two M2 ion channel inhibitors (amantadine and
rimatadine) have also been approved.
Evolutionary perspectives are important in considering treat-
ment options. For example, most IAV strains have developed re-
sistance to the M2 ion channel blockers; thus, amantadine drugs
Figure 1. Graphical summary of the reports of human and animal infections with the various influenza viruses (Genera influenza virus A, B, C, & D). It is
interesting to note that humans and pigs are thought to be susceptible to all four influenza genera. Among the animals with documented influenza infections,
many are domestic animals. In particular, poultry and pigs serve as important amplifying reservoirs for influenza A virus infections in man
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are not currently being recommended for preventing or treating
influenza [20]. While NA inhibitor medications are the current
recommended interventions, concerns are growing over the
emergence of oseltamivir-resistant strains. Since October 2017,
the CDC found 1.1% of 376 H1N1 IAV strains are resistant to both
oseltamivir and peramivir; however, all 903 H3N2 viruses tested
were susceptible to both oseltamivir and zanamivir [10]. New
monoclonal therapies are under development which may increase
therapeutic options for patients with severe IAV disease [21].
For healthy adults, annual trivalent or quadrivalent influenza
vaccines have been the major prophylactic prevention mechanism
for several decades. In order to inform the selection of the viral
composition of season vaccines, robust active surveillance and
epidemiological and evolutionary modeling is required to predict
the upcoming seasonal strains that will circulate in the Northern
and Southern hemispheres. Mismatches can occur, due in part to
frequent minor changes in virus glycoproteins occurs between the
time when the strains are selected and the time the vaccine is
produced, reducing the effectiveness of the vaccine as was the
case during this 2017–18 influenza season. Current vaccine effect-
iveness (VE) estimates of the 2017–18 vaccine are estimated at
36% overall with 25% VE specifically against H3N2-related illness
and 67% VE against H1N1 viruses [22]. When considering vaccine
options and effectiveness, there are several important scientific
and policy considerations related to availability, access and pre-
vention of future disease. From a One Health perspective, other
virus hosts and reservoirs of IAV should be considered in the
development of future vaccines as well as the surveillance of re-
sistance in the environment.
INFLUENZA B VIRUS
In the spring of 1940, influenza B virus (IBV) was first identified
from a child during an acute respiratory epidemic in the United
States [23]. Since then IBV strains have been recognized to cause
considerable seasonal morbidity and mortality with B/Victoria/2/
87-like (Victoria lineage) and B/Yamagata/16/88-like (Yamagata
lineage) strains being the most prevalent [24]. During influenza
seasons, IBV, along with IAV (H1N1) or H3N2 co-circulate and
become the most prevalent strains every 2–14 years [25].
Compared with IAV, IBV has less antigenic variation and fewer
subtypes [26]. Despite being considered less of a public health
threat than IAV, IBV has been reported with prevalence of up to
82.4% among individuals reporting influenza-like illness (ILI) [27]
and symptoms such as encephalitis, myositis, even death have
been previously reported [28].
IBV is mainly associated with human infection [29]; however,
other animal reservoirs have been proposed, suggesting that a
One Health perspective is also important for this influenza virus.
Pigs are susceptible to IBV and may serve as a natural reservoir
[30]. Additionally, antibodies against IBV have been isolated from
horses and pigs in Japan [31] and from dogs in Taiwan [32].
In 1999, influenza B was isolated from a harbor seal with a respira-
tory disease that was associated with a large seal die-off in the
Netherlands. Phylogenetic analyses of viruses obtained from seal
serum indicated that the IBV was of human origin [29]. Thus far,
no novel seal-reservoired IBV strains have been detected and no
evidence of IBV seal to human transmission has been reported.
At present, there are two approved antiviral drugs (NA inhibi-
tors oseltamivir and zanamivir) for IBV infection [33]. Oseltamivir
is the most widely administered for the prophylaxis and treatment
of IBV infection in patients older than 1 year [34]. Zanamivir is
administered to patients older than 7 years by inhalation and func-
tions directly in the respiratory tract [34]. Several studies show that
oseltamivir is less effective in treating IBV compared with the
treatment of IAV [35], zanamivir was equally effective for IAV
and IBV infections and more effective than oseltamivir for the
treatment of IBV [35]. However, evolutionarily new NA inhibitor
(NAI)-resistant IBV viruses pose a public health concern as they
are not susceptible to oseltamivir or zanamivir [36]. IBV variants,
including R152K, D198N, G109E and G402S, R152K have been
identified as NAI-resistant [36]. In addition to antiviral therapies,
currently a quadrivalent influenza vaccine, including two influenza
A subtypes (H1N1 and H3N2) and two influenza B lineages
(Victoria and Yamagata) are available [37].
As IBVs continue to pose a significant risk to the public,
particularly for children and the immunocompromised, better
therapies for IBV are greatly needed. From an evolutionary per-
spective it is important to choose vaccines and therapies that are
relevant to the new and evolving viruses and further research
Table 1. Characteristics of influenza viruses








Influenza A 1931 8 Oseltamivir, peramivir, zanamivir,
amantadine, rimatadine
Yes
Influenza B 1940 8 Oseltamivir, zanamivir Yes
Influenza C 1974 7 No effective antiviral treatment available No
Influenza D 2011 7 No antiviral treatment available No
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should be targeted to limit further development of resistance or
virulence in IBV variants. Similarly from a One Health perspective,
it is important to choose vaccines that incorporate information
from new and novel strains that emerge from host species.
INFLUENZA C VIRUS
First identified in humans in 1974, the most common reservoir for
influenza C virus (ICV) is humans, with up to 80% of individuals
acquiring antibodies to ICV by the age of 7–10 years [38]. Although
ICV infections are typically reported at extremely low frequency,
they are reported consistently. A study of Eastern Indian patients
with acute respiratory illness reported that 0.18% were ICV-posi-
tive from January 2011 to December 2012 [39]. In Scotland, ICV
was present in 0.2% of the 3300 human respiratory samples
among patients<2 years or>45 years old during the summer
and winter between 2006 and 2008 [40]. ICV outbreaks were also
reported in Singapore, Japan and France between 2004 and 2007
[41]. Additionally, ICV epidemics have been reported in Australia
approximately every 2 years during the years of 2010, 2012 and
2014 [42]. One proposed reason for this pattern involves evolu-
tionary change, driven by a high frequency of reassortment in ICV.
ICV has been known to naturally infect domestic pigs [43] and
feral dogs [44]. When feral dogs were nasally infected with human
ICV, they developed clinical symptoms while shedding the virus
for more than 10 days, suggesting that dogs may serve as natural
reservoirs for human ICV [44]. In addition, in a 2017 ICV antibody
study, dromedary camels in Kenya were suspected to serve as a
newly recognized host for ICV as they were found to harbor ICV
antibodies [45]. This recent discovery suggests that ICV, such as
IAV and IBV, may have a wider host range than previously thought.
Thus, a One Health approach to surveillance among animals and
among environments is needed for ICV, especially where ex-
tended interactions between animals and humans may favor spill-
over of the virus.
As the symptoms associated with ICV are less severe in com-
parison with other forms of influenza and respiratory infection
[46], less attention has been drawn to developing antivirals and
vaccines against ICV. Hence there are no effective antiviral treat-
ments or vaccines available for ICV [42]; however, in the develop-
ment of future therapies for ICV, it will be important to take a One
Health approach to evaluate the animal reservoirs for this virus
and their potential impact on the spread of the virus in humans.
INFLUENZA D VIRUS
In 2011, a viral isolate with50% amino acid homology to human
ICV was collected from a pig exhibiting ILI in Oklahoma [47].
Although initially believed to be a subtype of ICV, this virus has
now been recognized as a new genus in the Orthomyxoviridae
family: influenza D virus (IDV). Antibodies of IDV have been
detected in pigs, cattle, goats and sheep. In animals, the highest
prevalence of IDV has been detected in cattle with symptoms of
bovine respiratory disease, especially in calves (6–8 months) due
to their underdeveloped immune system [48]. Serological evi-
dence indicates IDV has been present in US cattle populations
since as early as 2004 [43]. A cross-sectional serological study of
cattle-exposed adults in Florida found a high prevalence (97%) of
neutralizing antibodies compared to non-exposed controls (18%)
suggesting occupational exposure risk [49]. Similarly, a study con-
ducted on cattle in Mississippi showed 94% seroprevalence in
neonatal beef cattle in addition to IDV transmission in comingled
cattle herds [50]. During a swine respiratory disease outbreak in
Northern Italy in 2015, the IDV genome was detected and isolated
in both pigs and cattle herds [51]. The IDV genome isolated from
the pigs was closely related to the viral genome isolated in the
United States in 2011. Additionally, the archived serum samples
from 2011 had lower IDV antibody titers when compared with the
serum samples collected in 2015, suggesting that the incidence of
IDV infections in pigs may have increased over time, and there-
fore, IDV may pose a public health threat to the community.
Relatively little is known about the potential zoonotic transmis-
sion of IDV to humans [47], and to date the signs and symptoms of
acute IDV in humans have not been described. With the increased
potential of IDV transmission in and between animal reservoirs,
and the high presence of neutralizing antibodies in cattle exposed
workers, there is a need to determine if IDV is zoonotic through
One Health oriented surveillance. Currently there is no recom-
mended therapy or vaccine available for IDV.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Since the 1918 influenza pandemic, there have been many
changes to public health infrastructure as well as new develop-
ments in vaccine technologies. Despite this, influenza viruses
exhibit remarkable evolutionary change and adaptation to new
animal hosts. The One Health approach has been proposed as
a way to work across disciplines to incorporate human, animal
and environmental health in order to solve complex problems,
such as infectious disease outbreaks. Novel One Health
strategies for future surveillance may include bioaerosol surveil-
lance at the human–animal interface. These alternative strategies
are advantageous due to low cost, less invasive sampling
methods that are acceptable to industry [52–56].
Today, novel research on influenza viruses is conducted not
only by medical doctors and vaccines scientists, but also veterin-
arians and the agricultural industry seeking to reduce influenza
virus morbidity in animal hosts. Additionally, during the 2009
H1N1 pandemic the global community was informed and a vac-
cine was prepared in record response time as a result of interna-
tional, multidisciplinary collaboration.
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In the future, it will be increasingly important for multiple dis-
ciplines to collaborate in studying influenza viruses in an effort to
mitigate influenza virus outbreaks in both humans and animals.
As these viruses continue to evolve, particularly in relation to
virulence, resistance and ecology, there is a need for rigorous col-
laboration using the One Health approach to prevent not only future
outbreaks but also to track the spread of infectious disease.
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